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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Andrew Taylor appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over him or, alternatively, when it denied his motion for 
leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). He contends that the district court 
insufficiently considered the mitigating information in both regards. He also contends 
that the waiver of his rights to file a Rule 35 motion and to appeal decisions in this case, 
which was part of his plea agreement, was, by its terms, limited to only prevent such 
challenges to the conviction and imposition of sentence, not to challenges of future 
decisions by the district court. Therefore, he requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, or alternatively, reverse the district court's 
decision denying his Rule 35 motion without a hearing, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Taylor was initially charged in 2011 with possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.50-51.) He ultimately entered into a plea 
agreement, whereby he would plead guilty as charged, and in exchange, the State 
would recommend a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. (R., p.81.) 
As part of that agreement, Mr. Taylor also waived "the right to (1) file a Rule 35 Motion 
(except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal any issues in this case, including all 
matters involving the plea or the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, 
including all suppression issues." (R., p.81 (emphasis in original).) 
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The presentence report (hereinafter, PSI) recommended that the district court 
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor. (PSI, p.12.)1 The GAIN-I Recommendation and 
Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS), prepared as part of the presentence report, 
ruled out various clinical diagnoses related to Mr. Taylor's mental health. (PSI, p.42.) It 
did not mention depression one way or the other. (See generally PSI, pp.41-54.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.117-18.) 
Mr. Taylor successfully completed the Traditional Rider program during that 
period of retained jurisdiction, thereby earning a recommendation for probation. (PSI, 
p.76.) He did not receive any formal disciplinary sanctions during that time, although he 
did receive two verbal warnings and an infraction. (PSI, p.78.) The rider staff noted that 
there was a positive shift in Mr. Taylor's understanding of his behavior, which resulted in 
a marked improvement in his participation in the program. (PSI, p.78.) He went on to 
serve in a leadership position with another group at the rider facility. (PSI, p.79.) As a 
result, the district court suspended Mr. Taylor's sentence for a three-year period of 
probation. (R., pp.127-131.) 
However, the State filed a motion to revoke probation eight months later. 
(R., pp.141-44.) Mr. Taylor admitted to violating several of the terms of his probation. 
(R., p.187.) As a result, the district court revoked Mr. Taylor's probation and retained 
jurisdiction for a second time. (R., pp.188-92.) 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"Confidential Exhibits Supreme Court No. 4114-2013." Included in this file are the PSI 
report and all the documents attached thereto (police reports, addendums from rider 
staff, etc.). 
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This time, Mr. Taylor was sent to the CAPP program. He was unable to 
complete two of his assigned programs. (PSI, p.82.) He also received three formal 
disciplinary reports and five informal sanctions. (PSI, pp.83-84.) The rider staff noted 
that Mr. Taylor's coursework reflected understanding and positive growth, but that his 
other behavior did not. (PSI, pp.85-86; see e.g. PSI, p.95 (1/5/13 C-Note indicating that 
Mr. Taylor was demonstrating positive progress during his program).) Based on 
Mr. Taylor's behavioral issues in the program, the rider staff recommended that the 
district court relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor. (PSI, p.81.) The district court, 
pointing to the reports that Mr. Taylor was not taking responsibility for his actions, but 
was rather, displaying a victim mentality, relinquished jurisdiction. (R., p.195-9S.) 
Mr. Taylor filed a Rule 35 motion six days later. (R., pp.200-01.) Supporting that 
motion, Mr. Taylor informed the district court that he was "suffering from depression," 
which he believed impacted his performance during the CAPP rider program.2 (R, 
p.200.) He also informed the district court that he was expecting to have a child born 
the next month, and wanted to work so as to support the child. (R, p.200.) As such, he 
requested that the district court modify his sentence so that he would be immediately 
eligible for parole. (R, p.200.) Mr. Taylor also requested a hearing to present further 
evidence and information in support of his motion. (R, p.200.) The State did not make 
any response to this motion. (See generally R) 
The district court did not immediately address Mr. Taylor's motion. (See 
generally R) A few months later, Mr. Taylor's attorney moved to withdraw as his 
2 The GRRS did not mention depression at all in its assessment of Mr. Taylor. (See 
generally PSI, pp.41-54.) The only mention of depression is in the C-Notes generated 
during the CAPP rider, but those notes do not indicate whether there was a diagnosis in 
that regard. (See PSI, pp.90-104; see generally PSI.) They simply indicate that Mr. 
Taylor was seeking, but not receiving, treatment for that condition. (PSI, p.91.) 
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representative and let the district court know that the Rule 35 motion was still pending. 
(R., pp.202-03.) A few days later, the district court entered an order denying 
Mr. Taylor's motion. (R., pp.206-09.) The basis for that denial was that "The defendant 
has not presented, in conjunction with this motion, any evidence that was not 
considered by the Court at the time the court relinquished jurisdiction." (R., p.209 
(emphasis from original).) The district court relied on its findings related to the CAPP 
rider report about Mr. Taylor's behavior in support of its decision to deny the Rule 35 
motion. (R., p.209.) 
Mr. Taylor filed a notice of appeal twenty-eight days after the district court 
entered its decision on his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.214-16.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 
motion without a hearing. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 Motion 
Without A Hearing 
A. The Waivers Included In The Plea Agreement Regarding The Ability To File A 
Rule 35 Motion And To Seek Appellate Relief Do Not Bar Mr. Taylor's Appeal 
The waiver in the plea agreement in this case is inapplicable to Mr. Taylor's Rule 
35 motion and current appeal for two reasons. First, the State, as the beneficiary of that 
term in the agreement, bore the burden of raising the issue of waiver in the district court. 
Because it did not invoke the waiver below, it cannot now raise the issue of waiver for 
the first time in its respondent's brief. Second, the specific terms of that agreement only 
indicate that Mr. Taylor was waiving his ability to challenge everything leading up to and 
including the initial sentencing decision. The principles of expressio unius est exlculsio 
alterius (hereinafter, expressio unius) and ejusdem generis, when applied to the waiver 
provision of the plea agreement, mean that the waiver provision specifically does not 
extend to decisions that occurred after the imposition of sentence, such as the 
relinquishment of jurisdiction. As such the waiver in the plea agreement does not bar 
appellate review of the Rule 35 motion. 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Held That The Party Favored By The Waiver 
Must Invoke The Waiver In A Timely Fashion 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the respondent in an appeal must file a 
motion to dismiss, prior to the filing of the appel/ate briefing, if it hopes to obtain 
dismissal of the appellant's appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights: 
Relying upon the above-quoted oral stipulation, the respondents contend 
that the appellants waived their right to appeal the district court's order. As 
the appellants correctly point out, however, an objection based upon such 
a stipulation should be raised by a motion to dismiss the appeal. Southern 
Indiana Power Co. v. Cook, 182 Ind. 505, 107 N.E. 12 (1914); Speeth v. 
Fields, 71 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio App.1946) (per curiam); 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal 
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and Error s 240 (1962); see Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93 
(1948); cf 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 241 (1962). Raising such an 
objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare the 
appellant further useless expenditures (for, e.g., an appeal bond, 
transcripts, and additional attorneys' fees). Having failed to move to 
dismiss the appeal, the respondents are in no position to rely, in 
their appellate brief, upon the alleged waiver of the right to appeal. 
Oneida, 95 Idaho at 106-07 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Oneida indicates that invocation of the waiver needs to be timely made.3 Id. In 
the case of a Rule 35 motion, the invocation of the waiver should be made in the district 
court, not for the first time on appeal, since, as both the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho 
Court of Appeals have held: "We will not address on appeal a challenge ... where the 
trial court was not given an opportunity to consider the issue." State v. Martin, 119 
Idaho 577, 579 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181 (1991); see also State 
v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 815 (Ct. App. 2003) ("As a general rule, issues must be 
raised before the trial court in order to be considered on appeal."), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887 (Ct. App. 2013). The only exception to 
this requirement is if the aggrieved party can show fundamental error. State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
Usually, this rule will be applied to appellants. However, there are certain 
situations when it will apply to the respondent, specifically, when the respondent has the 
burden of proof on the issue in question. See, e.g., State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 
3 The Court of Appeals has recently declared this argument to be "misplaced." 
State v. Booth, Not Reported in P.3d, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 324, p.2 n.1 (Ct. 
App. Jan. 14, 2014). However, it provides no explanation as to why that argument is 
misplaced. See generally id.; see also State v. Calvo-Jimenez, Not Reported in P.3d, 
2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 753 (et. App. Nov. 19, 2013) (deciding, without 
explanation, that the defendant had waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement). 
Given the existing precedent from both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals to the contrary, Mr. Taylor contends that those cases were wrongly decided. 
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598-99 (2013) (holding that, when the State failed to raise an issue for which it bore 
the burden of proof (harmless error), that issue would not be considered on appeal); 
compare Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 745 (2000) (holding 
that it is the party bearing the burden of proof to show error, and that, in that case, the 
respondent had no such burden, and therefore, the respondent's failure to address an 
issue was not reason to reverse the challenged order). In this case, because the State 
bears the burden of proof to show a waiver, Oneida, 95 Idaho at 106-07, its failure to 
assert the wavier before the district court prevents it from relying on the waiver for the 
first time on appeal. See, e.g., Martin, 119 Idaho at 579. 
2. If This Court Allows The State To Argue The Waiver On Appeal, The Terms 
Of The Waiver Provision Reveal That It Does Not Extend Beyond Challenges 
To The Initial Sentencing Determination 
In its entirety, the waiver provides: "By accepting this offer the defendant waives 
the right to: (1) file a Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal 
any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or the sentencing and 
any rulings made by the court, including all suppression issues." (R., p.81 (emphasis in 
original).) The language of the waiver demonstrates that the scope of the waiver 
provision is limited to those decisions that would be properly challenged in an appeal 
from the entry of judgment. As such, it does not prohibit appeals from decisions made 
after the entry of judgment. Compare State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886 (2013) 
(holding that a similar waiver did not prevent an appeal from the subsequent order of 
restitutio n). 
While the general phrase in the waiver does state Mr. Taylor waived his right to 
appeal any issue in this case (R., p.81), it is followed by an enumerated list of issues 
which could arise out of the entry of the judgment. (R., p.81.) Specifically, the waiver 
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applies to "all matters involving the plea or the sentencing and any rulings made by the 
court, including all suppression issues." (R., p.81 (emphasis added).) By listing these 
particular items as the issues which cannot be appealed, the agreement implicitly 
excludes all other items from the scope of the provision. See, e.g., State v. Acuna, 154 
Idaho 139, 141-42 (Ct. App. 2013) (using the principle of expressio unius - the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another - to interpret the terms of a plea 
agreement). Application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis further supports this 
interpretation of the provision. Ejusdem generis provides that, where general words of a 
statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words will be 
construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to those 
specifically enumerated. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486 (2003). Furthermore, 
the use of the phrase "rulings made by the district court" clearly evidences that the 
waiver is only to decisions made up to the point that the plea agreement was made. 
Straub, 153 Idaho at 886. Thus, by limiting the scope of this provision to waive an 
appeal from the entry of judgment, the provision does not extend to other, subsequent 
decisions. 
As such, the waiver provision does not prevent Mr. Taylor from challenging the 
district court's subsequent decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and deny his Rule 35 
motion on appeal. Based on this same analysis, particularly the second indicator, Mr. 
Taylor contends that the waiver provision vis-a-vis the ability to file a Rule 35 motion 
extended only insofar as he agreed not to file a Rule 35 motion challenging the initial 
imposition of sentence. 
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3. Alternatively. The Plea Agreement Is Ambiguous. And Lenity Requires That 
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Taylor's Favor 
Mr. Taylor contends that reading the waiver provision to have a limited scope is a 
reasonable interpretation of that provision. In fact, as discussed infra, he contends that 
it is the most reasonable interpretation of that provision. However, if this Court 
concludes that the broader reading of the waiver provision is also reasonable, then 
there are two reasonable interpretations, and the rule of lenity applies. "Whether an 
ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a question of law, over which [Idaho appellate 
courts exercise] free review." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson,151 Idaho 449, 455 (2011). 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by courts in 
accordance with contract law standards. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 496 (Ct. 
App. 2012). An instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations is 
ambiguous. Knipe Land Co., 151 Idaho at 455. "Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to 
be interpreted in favor of the defendant. As with other contracts, provisions of plea 
agreements are occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear 
responsibility for any lack of clarity.'" State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596 (2010) 
(quoting United States v. De /a Fuente, 8 F3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, if 
this Court finds that there are two reasonable interpretations of the waiver provision in 
this case, lenity requires that the Court adopt Mr. Taylor's reasonable interpretation. As 
such, the waiver provision would Mr. Taylor's appellate challenge to the decisions to 
relinquish jurisdiction and deny his Rule 35 motion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 Motion 
Without A Hearing 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
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which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State 
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence reduction 
pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in light of new 
or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. "The criteria for 
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were 
altered by the new evidence Mr. Taylor presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. 
A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho 
at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
As a preliminary matter, the district court applied the wrong standard to 
Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 motion. The district court asserted that Mr. Taylor had failed to 
present "any evidence that was not considered by the Court at the time the court 
relinquished jurisdiction." (R., p.209 (emphasis in original).) Defendants seeking relief 
under Rule 35 do not necessarily need to present new evidence to merit relief, or, at 
least, a hearing, on their motions. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hen 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (emphasis added). 
The district court misapplied this standard by requiring Mr. Taylor to provide new 
evidence, even though the rule allows a defendant seeking Rule 35 relief to support his 
motion with new or additional information as well as new evidence. In this case, 
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Mr. Taylor did provide the district court with new information: that he was suffering from 
depression, and that he was expecting the birth of his first child. There is no indication 
in the record that the district court had been made previously aware that Mr. Taylor was 
suffering from depression. (See generally R, PSI.) The only references to "depression," 
which are in the C-Notes generated during Mr. Taylor's CAPP rider program, indicate 
episodes of depression, but not a diagnosis from which he was suffering. (See PSI, 
pp.90-104.) Therefore, the fact that Mr. Taylor was suffering from depression is new or 
additional information that the district court did not have when it relinquished jurisdiction. 
There is also no indication in the record that Mr. Taylor was about to become a father. 
(See generally R, PSI.) Therefore, the fact that his first child was about to born is new 
information for the district court to consider. 
The new or additional information that Mr. Taylor presented in support of his Rule 
35 motion should have at least merited a hearing, if not a grant of relief. First, Idaho 
Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a 
sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Taylor informed the 
district court that he was suffering from depression, and that he believed that 
depression had an impact on his behavior during the CAPP program. (R., p.200.) 
Given that the only assessment of Mr. Taylor's mental health - the GRRS evaluation 
performed before his initial sentencing does not mention "depression" at all, not even to 
rule it out - the district court could not have adequately considered Mr. Taylor's mental 
health when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction. All the district court had were some 
suggestions that depression or stress were affecting Mr. Taylor's performance during 
the CAPP rider. (PSI, p.91 ("I also questioned if he [Mr. Taylor] has attempted to work 
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with or talk to any clinician staff in regards to his stress or depression and he claimed 
that he has kited Mrs. Wolff repeatedly and has yet to get a response.").) 
If Mr. Taylor was indeed suffering from depression and was not getting treatment, 
that would have a significant impact on his ability to succeed in the rider program.4 That 
is a factor which does impact the district court's decision on whether it should relinquish 
jurisdiction. See Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581; I.C. § 19-2521(1)(b) (providing that, if the 
defendant is in need of treatment "that can be provided most effectively by his 
commitment to an institution," that is a factor indicating the district court should not 
suspend a sentence, thereby implying that if treatment would be more effectively 
provided without incarceration, that is a factor that should weigh against incarceration) 
(emphasis added). The CAPP rider staff reported that Mr. Taylor's coursework was 
demonstrating improvement. (PSI, pp.85-86, 95.) This is consistent with Mr. Taylor's 
performance during his traditional rider program. (PSI, pp.76-79.) The issue during the 
CAPP program was Mr. Taylor's behavior. (PSI, pp.81-84.) This combination of facts 
reveals that there likely was some other issue in play during Mr. Taylor's CAPP program 
other than just a lack of rehabilitative potential. That made it all the more necessary for 
the district court to at least have held a hearing and inquired as to Mr. Taylor's mental 
health condition, since it was an important factor for the district court to consider. 
Given that Mr. Taylor demonstrated an ability to rehabilitate and treatment was 
available outside of prison (see, e.g., PSI, p.53), the time at which Mr. Taylor received 
that treatment was also an important consideration. State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 
4 Depression interferes with daily life and can impact the patient's ability to 
work, sleep, eat, or function normally. National Institute of Mental Health, What is 
Depression, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/depression/index.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 14,2014). 
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(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); 
Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,639 (Ct. App. 1988). This is 
particularly true given the fact that, although he has numerous misdemeanor 
convictions, the underlying crime was Mr. Taylor's first felony conviction. (See PSI, 
pp.3-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminaL" Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, 
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 ». Therefore, it considered the fact that it 
was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Given all these facts, considered in light of the new evidence Mr. Taylor offered about 
his mental health condition, the district court's decision to deny the Rule 35 motion 
without a hearing was an abuse of discretion. 
The district court also needed to sufficiently consider the fact that Mr. Taylor was 
about to become a father. The fact that Mr. Taylor was looking to be a supportive 
parent is an indication that he is maturing, and that is a factor which weighs in favor of a 
more lenient disposition. Sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the 
prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased 
the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 
(Ct. App. 1988). Since Mr. Taylor's behavior demonstrates his maturation, the waiver 
provision indicates a more lenient disposition is appropriate, and thus, that relief 
pursuant to Rule 35 should have been granted. 
Additionally, family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can 
help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to 
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familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support 
been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). 
This new information indicates that Mr. Taylor is attempting to build this part of his 
support network, which demonstrates that a more lenient disposition is appropriate, and 
thus, that relief pursuant to Rule 35 should have been granted. 
Furthermore, Mr. Taylor was not asking for a reduction in the total length of his 
sentence, but merely that his sentence be restructured so that he would be immediately 
parole-eligible. (R., p.200.) This demonstrates, to some degree, an acceptance of 
responsibility for his actions, since he was willing to accept the consequences of his 
actions. The acceptance of responsibility is a factor to be considered by the district 
court. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815. And, even if such relief were granted, it would not 
necessarily mean that Mr. Taylor would be released from prison. The Parole Board has 
broad discretion over whether or not to parole an inmate. See, e.g., Stover, 140 Idaho 
at 931. Therefore, even though the requested relief would make Mr. Taylor eligible for 
parole, the Board might not decide to grant parole at that time, causing Mr. Taylor to 
serve some or all of his seven-year unified sentence in prison. Such a result would still 
address all the sentencing objectives. See Ransom, 124 Idaho at 713. What the more 
lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence would not is the opportunity 
to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now 
than in the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, based on all these factors, 
the district court's decision to deny Rule 35 relief, particularly without holding a hearing, 
was an abuse of its discretion. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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